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INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO INCREASED EXTERNAL 
SUPPORT FOR GRADUATE STUDENTS 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Daniel I. Rees, and Dominic J. Brewer* 
Abstract-This paper uses institutionally based data to esti- 
mate how universities would respond to increased federal 
support for graduate students. It demonstrates that doctor- 
ate-producing universities do respond to changes in the num- 
ber of full-time science and engineering students supported 
on external funds by altering the number of students that they 
support on institutional funds. Institutional adjustment to 
changes in external support levels appears to be quite rapid. 
However, in the aggregate, the magnitude of these responses 
is quite small. 
I. Introduction 
PROJECTIONS of forthcoming shortages of 
Ph.D.s, and thus new faculty for the aca- 
demic sector, abound.1 Indeed, one major book 
projected at least a 43 percent underproduction 
of new doctorates in the arts and sciences as a 
whole during the 1997-2002 period.2 Part of the 
reason for these projections is that American 
college graduates are much less likely to receive 
doctorates today than they were 20 years ago. 
While the ratio of doctorates granted by Ameri- 
can universities to bachelors' degrees granted by 
American colleges and universities six years ear- 
lier was 0.064 in 1970-71, it fell to 0.035 in 
1978-79 and has remained roughly constant at 
the lower level since then.3 
Numerous factors probably contribute to the 
decline in the propensity of American col- 
lege graduates to receive doctorates, including 
the weak academic labor market that existed 
throughout the period. Between academic years 
1970-71 and 1980-81 the salary of the average 
faculty member in the United States fell by about 
21.1% in real terms. While faculty salaries rose in 
real terms during the 1980s, by the end of the 
decade, the average faculty member was barely 
earning in real terms what he or she had earned 
twenty years earlier.4 
Another important factor may well be the in- 
crease in the length of time necessary for doctor- 
ate students to complete their programs. The 
median registered time to degree for new Ph.D.s 
granted in the United States in 1968 was 5.5 
years. By 1988, this figure had risen to 6.9 years. 
The increase has been even more dramatic in 
some fields; for example, in the social sciences 
median registered time to degree rose from 5.1 to 
7.4 years and in the humanities from 5.5 to 8.5 
years during the same period.5 Increases in 
times-to-degree may also have been at least par- 
tially due to the weak academic labor market that 
prevailed during the period.6 
Economists define shortages as arising when, at 
the prevailing salaries in an occupation, the quan- 
tity of labor demanded exceeds the quantity of 
labor supplied. As long as salaries are free to rise, 
shortages will eventually be eliminated. Concern 
over potential shortages of doctorates to academia 
occurs both because academic institutions may 
not possess the resources to increase faculty 
salaries substantially and because the time it takes 
graduate students to complete doctoral degrees is 
sufficiently long that even if salaries were to rise, 
the supply of new doctorates would not increase 
for a number of years. Thus, if shortages do 
materialize in the future, they may persist for a 
number of years. 
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Among the policies urged to prevent future 
Ph.D. shortages is increased federal support for 
graduate students. Such a policy would reduce 
the private costs of doctoral study and thus hope- 
fully should increase the number of college grad- 
uates willing to undertake graduate study. To the 
extent that financial support reduces the time 
students need to complete degrees and increases 
their probability of completing doctoral pro- 
grams, the future supply of Ph.D.s should further 
increase. While conceptually these roles of fi- 
nancial support on the supply of doctorates are 
clear, empirical evidence on the effects of finan- 
cial support on doctoral production is actually 
quite scanty.7 
Lost in the policy debate, however, has been 
any concern for the possibility that changes in 
federal support, or other external support to the 
institution, for graduate education may simply 
induce an academic institution to redirect its own 
financial resources in a way that at least partially 
frustrates the intent of such a policy. For exam- 
ple, increased federal support for graduate stu- 
dents in the sciences may lead an institution to 
cut back somewhat on (or not increase as rapidly 
as it had planned) its own internal support for 
graduate students in the sciences and use the 
funds saved either to support graduate students 
in other disciplines or for other purposes (e.g., 
nongraduate student expenditures or moderating 
planned tuition increases). Conversely, faced with 
cutbacks in federal or other external support, 
institutions may react by attempting to partially 
offset the cutbacks by increasing their own inter- 
nal support for graduate education. 
To the extent that changes in external financial 
support for graduate education lead institutions 
to alter their own support levels, or allocations 
across fields, the changes in the field composition 
and total number of doctorate students supported 
that result may be different than policymakers 
intended. To fully analyze the likely effects of an 
increase in federal support for graduate students, 
an analysis of the extent to which the federal 
funds would displace institutional funds is thus 
required. Such an analysis is undertaken in this 
paper, using institutionally-based ata for science 
(including social science) and engineering fields. 
Unfortunately, data do not exist that would per- 
mit similar analyses for the humanities and for 
professional fields other than engineering. 
We begin in the next section with a discussion 
of the aggregate time-series evidence on how 
support for graduate students in science and en- 
gineering has changed. While this evidence 
suggests that federal policies may influence insti- 
tutional support levels, causation can not be in- 
ferred from these aggregate data. 
In section III, we present institutionally-based 
econometric analyses of the determinants of the 
number of full-time graduate students in science 
and engineering fields that receive institutional 
support. The analyses are extended in section IV 
to field-specific data and attempts made to ascer- 
tain if increased external support to one field may 
influence internal support allocations to other 
fields. The brief concluding section summarizes 
our findings and lays out an agenda for future 
research. 
II. Aggregate Time-Series Evidence 
Data for the 1966 to 1988 period on the num- 
ber of full-time science (including the social sci- 
ences and psychology) and engineering graduate 
students (FTSEG) in doctorate-granting institu- 
tions, and the number of these by major source of 
support, come from the National Science Foun- 
dation. The percentages of FTSEG by major 
source of support each year are presented in 
table 1. 
The data in columns (A) come from a survey 
whose scope changed over time. For example, in 
1972 the survey was expanded to include gradu- 
ate students in doctorate-granting institutions in 
departments that granted only masters degrees, 
while in 1973 it was expanded to include graduate 
students in medical and clinical sciences. Re- 
sponse rates to this survey varied over time. The 
data in columns (B) come from a separate, but 
similar survey. Response rates to this latter sur- 
vey also varied over time. The two surveys over- 
lapped during the 1974 to 1977 period and for the 
last three years in which they overlapped, they 
yielded virtually identical aggregate numbers. 
During the 1966 to 1988 period, the number of 
FTSEG at doctorate-granting institutions whose 
major source of support came from the federal 
government fluctuated in the 43,000 to almost 
55,000 range. In recent years, however, there has 7 See Ehrenberg, chapter 8. 
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TABLE l.-PERCENTAGE OF FULL-TIME SCIENCE / ENGINEERING GRADUATE STUDENTS 
BY MAJOR SOURCE OF SUPPORT IN DOCTORATE GRANTING INSTITUTIONS 
Percent Percent Percent Other Percent 
Federal Institutional Outside Support Self-Support 
Year (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) 
1966 40.9 35.0 6.1 18.0 
1969 36.6 35.7 9.0 18.6 
1970 34.4 36.9 9.2 19.5 
1971 31.7 37.0 8.8 22.4 
1972 30.0 38.6 8.3 23.1 
1974 25.5 24.6 39.9 38.5 8.9 8.4 25.8 28.6 
1975 22.9 36.7 8.0 32.4 
1976 22.5 22.7 37.0 37.0 8.2 8.3 32.3 32.0 
1977 23.1 23.2 36.9 37.0 8.5 8.4 31.6 31.5 
1978 23.7 36.8 8.9 30.6 
1979 23.7 37.1 9.0 30.3 
1980 23.0 37.6 9.1 30.3 
1981 21.7 38.5 9.6 30.2 
1982 19.9 39.4 10.0 30.8 
1983 19.4 39.5 10.0 31.0 
1984 19.3 40.6 10.0 30.1 
1985 19.6 41.0 10.6 28.9 
1986 19.8 41.6 10.2 28.4 
1987 20.2 41.9 9.5 28.4 
1988 20.4 42.2 9.5 27.8 
Source: Authors' computations from: 
A) National Science Foundation, Graduate Student Support and Manpower Resources in Graduate Science 
Education, Fall 1965 and Fall 1966 (figure 9), Fall 1969 (table C10a), Fall 1970 (table C81), Fall 1971 (table C9); 
National Science Foundation, Graduate Science Education: Student Support and Postdoctorals, Fall 1972 (table 
C14); National Science Foundation, Graduate Science Education: Student Support and Postdoctorals, Detailed 
Statistical Tables, Fall 1974 (table B13), Fall 1975 (p. 11), Fall 1976 (table B10), Fall 1977 (table B10). 
B) National Science Foundation, Academic Science/Engineering: Graduate Enrollment and Support, Fall 1988 
(table C17), Fall 1981 (table C14). 
been a clear upward trend. The number of stu- 
dents on federal support rose steadily between 
1982 and 1988 and the 1988 level of 54,852 was 
over 16 percent higher than the 1982 level of 
47,206. However, the total number of FTSEG 
enrolled in doctorate-granting institutions in- 
creased throughout the period, rising from about 
195,500 in 1975 to almost 268,400 in 1988. As a 
result, as table 1 indicates, the share of FTSEG 
in doctorate-granting institutions whose major 
source of financial support came from the federal 
government, fell from over 40% in 1966 to slightly 
over 19% in 1984. Between 1984 and 1988, as the 
number of FTSEG with federal support in- 
creased, the share with federal support increased 
slightly to 20.4%. However, this is still well below 
the shares experienced in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. 
Table 1 also reports information on the per- 
centages of FTSEG whose major sources of sup- 
port came from "institutional" funds, "other out- 
side" funds, and "self-support". In these data, 
"institutional funds" are defined to include funds 
from state governments administered by the insti- 
tutions, "other outside" funds include funds de- 
rived from foundations and corporations, as well 
as from foreign sources, while "self-support" in- 
cludes loans, family support, and earnings from 
outside the university. 
Quite strikingly, the fall from 1974 to 1988 in 
the percentage of FTSEG whose major source of 
support was the federal government from 24.6 to 
20.4 was substantially offset by the increase in the 
percentage of FTSEG whose major source of 
support was institutional. As noted above, while 
this suggests that changes in federal support for 
graduate students may induce institutions to alter 
their own support levels, causation should not be 
inferred from these aggregate time-series data.8 
8 We must also caution that these data refer to students' 
major sources of support. So, for example, suppose a student 
who was initially receiving a $15,000 tuition waiver from an 
institution subsequently received a supplementary $16,000 
fellowship stipend from the federal government. The student's 
reported major source of support would shift from the institu- 
tion to the federal government. However, no reduction in 
institutional support would have occurred. Thus, the use of 
these "major source" of support data may overstate the extent 
of substitution of external for institutional funds. 
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III. Institutionally Based Analyses 
Consider the following simple equation that 
seeks to explain the number of FTSEG in institu- 
tion j in academic year t supported by institu- 
tional funds (Ijt). This equation can be motivated 
by a simple utility maximizing model of university 
behavior discussed in an appendix available upon 
request from the authors.9 
Ijt= ao + a,Xjt + a2Fjt + a3Ajt 
+ vjt + Ejt. (1) 
Here Xjt is the number of undergraduate stu- 
dents that the institution expects to be enrolled in 
science and engineering courses during the aca- 
demic year, Fjt is the number of science and 
engineering faculty employed by the institution in 
the academic year, Ajt is the number of FTSEG 
in the institution supported by federal govern- 
ment and other external funds in the academic 
year, vjt is an institution-specific error term, and 
Ejt is a random error term. 
Presumably an increase in undergraduate stu- 
dent enrollments will increase the institution's 
demand for teaching assistants, so a1 is expected 
to be positive. While an increase in science and 
engineering faculty size will similarly increase the 
institution's demand for graduate research assis- 
tants, holding undergraduate enrollments con- 
stant, it might decrease the institution's demand 
for teaching assistants. Thus, the sign of a2 is 
a priori indeterminate. 
The key variable in the model is the number of 
FTSEG supported on external funds. At one 
extreme, if the number of students the institution 
supports is independent of the number that fed- 
eral government and other external sources sup- 
port, no displacement takes place and a3 will be 
zero. In contrast, if the institution reduces the 
number of students it supports by exactly the 
number that the federal government and other 
external sources support, displacement will be 
complete and a3 will equal minus one. Values of 
a3 between zero and minus one indicate partial 
substitution of external for institution funds. 
In theory, equation (1) can be estimated using 
a single year's data for a cross-section of doctor- 
ate-producing universities. However, the institu- 
tion-specific error term presents a problem. Surely 
there are many other variables besides an institu- 
tion's undergraduate enrollments and its faculty 
size that should affect its willingness to finance 
graduate students out of its own internal funds. 
Omission of these variables, which are captured 
by the institution-specific error term, may lead to 
biased coefficient estimates. 
For example, suppose institutions that place a 
high value on graduate education and research 
simultaneously support above average (given their 
size) numbers of graduate students and hire 
first-rate faculty, who succeed in attracting 
above-average levels of support for graduate stu- 
dents from federal government and other exter- 
nal research grants. In the context of equation 
(1), this can be interpreted as high values for the 
institution-specific error term (vjy) simultaneously 
causing the numbers of FTSEG supported by 
external (Aft) and institutional (Ijt) funds to be 
high. Thus, a spurious positive correlation will 
arise between the numbers of FTSEG supported 
by institutional and external funds and, if we 
ignore the institutional-specific error term, our 
estimate of a3 will likely be biased. 
One way around the problem is to try to make 
the institution-specific error term "observable" by 
including other variables with which it is likely to 
be correlated in the analyses (e.g., prestige mea- 
sures of science and engineering fields in the 
institution). While we pursue such a strategy be- 
low, here we adopt a more parsimonious ap- 
proach. 
If one is willing to treat the institutional-specific 
error term as fixed over time (vit = vi) and one 
can obtain data for two or more time periods, 
then one can write equation (1) for each two 
adjacent periods (t and t - 1), and take first 
Alternatively, suppose some of an institution's top students, 
who would have received institutional fellowships, get external 
fellowships instead. Suppose the university uses some (but not 
all) of the released institutional funds to provide lower-priced 
teaching assistantships for an equal number of other students, 
who otherwise would have to pay for themselves. In this case, 
there would be no reduction in the number of students being 
supported by institutional funds, but the number of dollars 
spent by the institution on graduate student support would 
have declined. Thus, our data would understate the extent of 
substitution. 
The reader should keep these examples in mind when 
drawing conclusions from the econometric models presented 
below. Unfortunately data are not collected by department on 
the variety of sources from which a student receives any 
support nor on the dollar amount of each type of support. 9 See Garvin (1980) and James (1990) for more extensive 
discussions of utility maximizing models of university behav- 
ior. 
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TABLE 2.-DETERMINANTS OF INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR FULL-TIME SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING GRADUATE STUDENTS 
IN RESEARCH AND DOCTORATE UNIVERSITIES, FALL 1979 TO FALL 1984: FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
(absolute value t-statistic) 
ITOT 
(la) (2a) (3a) (4a) (lb) (2b) (3b) (4b) 
TD .111(5.9) .109(5.9) .106(5.5) .101(5.3) .055(3.1) .052(3.0) .046(2.6) .041(2.3) 
FTE .148(8.6) .148(8.6) .122(7.0) .124(7.2) .085(5.2) .085(5.2) .055(3.3) .055(3.4) 
ATOT -.182(5.1) -.023(0.5) -.061(1.5) -.146(4.4) .013(0.3) -.019(0.5) 
ATOTI -.162(4.4) 
-.126(3.7) 
ATOTD -.147(3.8) 
-.111(3.1) 
ATOT1 
-.728(6.1) 
-.715(6.6) 
ATOT2 
-2.171(8.1) 
-2.211(9.2) 
Year Dummies 
Included no no no no yes yes yes yes 
R .984 .984 .984 .984 .986 .986 .987 .987 
FICE/DOFa 204/999 204/998 176/867 176/867 204/994 204/993 176/862 176/862 
Sources: 
(1) National Science Foundation, Survey of Graduate Science and Engineering Students and Postdoctorates: Fall 19xx (ITOT, ATOT). (2) National Science Foundation, Survey of Scientific and Engineering Personnel Employed at Universities and Colleges: January 19xx (FTE). (3) National Center for Education Statistics, Higher Educational General Information Survey (HEGIS): Academic Year 19xx (TD). (4) Lyle V. Jones, Gardner Lindzey and Porter E. Coggeshall, eds., An Assessment of Research/Doctorate Programs in the United States (Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press, 1982) (ATOT1, ATOT2). 
(1), (2), (3) and (4) are all available as part of the National Science Foundation's Computer Aided Science Policy Analysis and Research Database System (CASPAR). However, ITOT is not reported in CASPAR and the underlying data tapes must be used to obtain this variable. 
Notes: 
ITOT = number of full-time science and engineering graduate students (FTSEG) supported by institutional and state funds on fellowships, trainee- 
ships, research assistantships, teaching assistantships or other types (primarily tuition waivers) of support in the fall of year t. 
TD = total bachelors' degrees in science and engineering granted by the institution in academic year t + 1. 
FTE = total full-time scientific and engineering personnel employed by the institution in January of year t + 1. 
ATOT = number of FTSEG supported by federal government, other United States external (primarily corporate and nonprofit), and foreign funds in 
the fall of year t. 
A TOTI = A TOT if A TOT 2 A TOT(- 1), 0 otherwise. 
A TOTD = A TOT if A TOT < A TOT(- 1), 0 otherwise. 
ATOT1 = ATOT times the fraction of the institution's graduate programs that were rated at least one standard deviation above the rating of the mean 
program in their field in the 1982 National Research Council Doctorate Program ratings. 
ATOT2 = ATOT times the fraction of the institution's graduate programs that were rated at least two standard deviations above the rating of the mean 
program in their field in the 1982 ratings. 
aFICE number of institutional dummy variables included in the analysis. DOF number of degrees of freedom. 
differences to obtain 
ijt Iit - 1 
= a1(X1t - X1t-1) 
+ a2(Fjt-Fit -1) + a3(Ajt-Ajt - 1) 
+ ( Ejt- 'Ejt - l ) - (2) 
Estimation of (2), in which all variables are ex- 
pressed as changes, will yield unbiased estimates 
of the parameter of interest, a3, because the 
unobserved fixed effect has been eliminated from 
the model. Alternatively, one can obtain unbiased 
estimates by estimating an augmented version of 
the original model that includes institution- 
specific intercept terms. 
Table 2 presents estimates that use the latter 
approach and data from 200 doctorate producing 
universities on the number of FTSEG supported 
on institutional funds for each academic year 
between the Fall of 1979 and the Fall of 1984.10 
10 One can also formally test if the fixed effects model is 
appropriate by shifting Ijft1 to the right-hand side of (2) and 
estimating a variant of the resulting equation that allows the 
coefficients of the contemporaneous and lagged value for each 
explanatory variable to differ in magnitude (as well as sign) 
and the coefficient of Ijt_ 1 to differ from unity. (Since Ijt_ 1 is 
correlated with Ejt-l, an instrument must be used for Ij,_ 
and this instrument is obtained from a regression of Iit on 
I-t-2 and the values from period t - 1 of the other explana- 
tory variables in the model.) When models were estimated 
that correspond to those found in columns (la), (2a), (3a), and 
(4a) of table 2, formal F tests indicated that one can not 
reject the joint hypotheses that the coefficients of the contem- 
poraneous and lagged value for each explanatory variable are 
equal and opposite in sign and that the coefficient of Itj 1 is 
unity. That is, one can not reject the hypothesis that the fixed 
effects model is appropriate. 
The importance of controlling for the fixed effects should be 
emphasized. When equation (1) was estimated in level form 
using the pooled data set, but ignoring the institution specific 
error term, the coefficient of the number of students sup- 
ported on external funds switched signs, had a magnitude of 
about 0.3, and was statistically significantly different from 
zero. The coefficients of the other explanatory variables re- 
mained roughly the same as in the fixed effects specification. 
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The number of FTSEG supported on external 
funds in the Fall of each year (ATOT) is defined 
as the sum of the numbers supported on federal 
government funds, on foreign funds, and on other 
United States (primarily corporate and nonprofit 
organization) funds. Support is defined here to 
include fellowships, traineeships, research assis- 
tantships (including those on externally funded 
research grants to faculty), teaching assis- 
tantships, and other types (primarily tuition 
waivers). These data come from the annual Na- 
tional Science Foundation Survey of Graduate 
Science and Engineering Students and Postdoctor- 
ates. 
Data on enrollments in undergraduate science 
and engineering courses by institution are not 
available. What is available from the annual Na- 
tional Center for Education Statistics Higher Ed- 
ucational General Information Survey is the total 
number of bachelors' degrees awarded in science 
and engineering fields by an institution in each 
academic year.11 While there is not necessarily a 
one-to-one relationship between changes in 
course enrollments and changes in graduating 
majors, the latter is the best proxy available for 
the former. Changes in degrees granted may well 
also lag changes in undergraduate enrollments. 
Preliminary analyses suggested that bachelors' 
degrees granted in science and engineering in the 
next academic year (TD) is a better predictor of 
institutional funding for graduate students in the 
current year than degrees granted in the current 
year and the former variable is used throughout 
the paper (Ehrenberg, Rees, and Brewer, 1992). 
Finally, no data exist by institution on the 
number of faculty employed in science and engi- 
neering fields. However, from 1973 to 1985 the 
National Science Foundation's Survey of Scien- 
tific and Engineering Personnel Employed at Uni- 
versities and Colleges collected information from 
doctorate granting institutions in January of each 
year on the total number of full-time scientists 
and engineers employed.12 These "headcounts" 
are not restricted to faculty, nor even to doctor- 
ates, but probably provide a reasonable approxi- 
mation to the scale of research and teaching 
activity in science and engineering fields in the 
institution. Restricting the "headcount" to full- 
time employees assures that graduate assistants 
are not included in the total. While it is again not 
a priori obvious whether the best predictor of the 
demand for research and teaching assistants in 
the Fall of a year, would be the number of 
full-time scientists and engineers employed in the 
institution in January of that year (the previous 
academic year) or in January of the next year (the 
current academic year), the latter proved to be 
more important in preliminary analyses and it 
(FTE) is used throughout the paper (Ehrenberg, 
Rees, and Brewer, 1992). 
The results reported in columns (la) through 
(4a) of table 2 suggest that changes in external 
support levels for FTSEG do influence institu- 
tional support levels.13 The simplest specification 
(col. la), suggests that for every 100 additional 
students supported by external funds, institutions 
reduced the number supported by institutional 
funds by about 18. Whether the money saved was 
used to support graduate students in other non- 
science/nonengineering fields, or for other pur- 
poses, can not be determined from these data. 
Does this substitution of external for internal 
funds occur when external support is contracting 
as well as when it is expanding? The estimates 
reported in column (2a) allow the effects of 
changes in external support levels to differ be- 
tween situations when external support is increas- 
ing (ATOTI) and when it is decreasing (ATOTD). 
The estimated effects are roughly equal suggest- 
ing that institutional res,ponses to positive and 
negative changes in external funding are symmet- 
ric. 
To say that substitution occurs is not to say 
that it occurs equally at all institutions. One way 
to stratify institutions is to rank them by the 
proportion of their doctorate programs that were 
rated at least one (or two) standard deviations 
above the rating of the mean program in their 
respective field in the 1982 National Research 
Council assessment of doctorate programs (Jones, 
11 In recent years the scope of the HEGIS survey has been 
expanded and it is now called the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS). 
12 The cessation of this survey in January of 1985 precludes 
us from using more recent data on institutional and external 
support for graduate students in our analyses. 
13 The high R2 in table 2 (and table 4 that follows) are due 
to the presence of the institution specific intercept terms in 
the level form of the model that was estimated. When the 
model was estimated in first difference form (equation 2) the 
same coefficients are obtained but the R2 falls to roughly 
0.05. 
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Lindzey, and Coggeshall, 1982). The models esti- 
mated in columns (3a) and (4a) include interac- 
tions of these proportions with ATOT (ATOT1 
and ATOT2, respectively).14 The coefficients of 
ATOT itself become statistically insignificant in 
these models, while the interaction terms are 
negative and significant,15 This suggests that the 
substitution of external for internal funds occurs 
primarily at institutions with highly rated pro- 
grams; these tend to be the larger Research I 
(Carnegie category) institutions. Institutions with 
lesser rated programs apparently treat changes in 
external funding in a different manner; these 
institutions allow programs to "keep" all in- 
creases to help them improve, but in return make 
programs bear the full cost of all decreases in 
external funding. 
Finally, columns (lb) through (4b) replicate the 
models previously estimated, adding to each a set 
of year dummy variables. To the extent that the 
latter variables capture the effects of nationwide 
changes in external support for FTSEGs that 
affect many institutions (for example, changes in 
the number of federal traineeships available), the 
estimated ATOT coefficients in these latter spec- 
ifications may reflect primarily institutional re- 
sponses to changes in the share of a given level of 
external funding that programs receive. On bal- 
ance, the estimated responses are only slightly 
smaller than those found in the earlier specifica- 
tion, which suggests that institutional responses 
to change in external support for FTSEG are 
only slightly larger when the change is due to a 
change in national policy faced by all institutions, 
than when the change is due to a program's 
winning (or losing) a greater share of a given 
number of externally supported positions that are 
available nationwide.16 
The results reported in table 2 assume instan- 
taneous adjustment of the number of FTSEG 
students supported on institutional funds to an- 
nual changes in the number of FTSEG students 
supported on external funds, the number of de- 
grees granted, and faculty size. Generalizing the 
model to capture the dynamics of the external 
support/institutional support interrelationship 
can proceed along at least two different lines.17 
First, one can allow changes in external sup- 
port levels in one year to affect the intertemporal 
allocation of institutional funds to support 
FTSEG.18 For example, the provision of external 
fellowships to support first-year entering graduate 
students in a field in year t might induce an 
institution to reduce its internal support for en- 
tering students in the field in year t. However, to 
the extent that substitution was not one-for-one, 
the size of its entering class will have increased 
and thus the number of advanced FTSEG who 
need support will increase in subsequent years. 
To the extent that an institution uses some, or all, 
of the "saved" internal funds in year t to support 
an increased number of FTSEG in subsequent 
years, focusing on contemporaneous responses, as 
we have done, will overstate the extent of substi- 
tution of external for institutional funds. A simi- 
lar result would occur if institutions that previ- 
ously provided support to students for four years 
used some of the saved internal funds in year t to 
provide fifth year support in year t + 4 for some 
of the new students who entered in year t. 
One way to test such a hypothesis is to reesti- 
mate equation (1), adding as additional explana- 
tory variables lagged values of external support 
for graduate students. The estimated coefficients 14Only data from 177 institutions appear in these analyses 
because smaller programs were not ranked. 
15 The mean proportions of fields in an institution ranked 
one and two standard deviations above their respective field 
means were 0.11 and 0.02, respectively, in this sample, so that 
on average the extent of substitution of external for internal 
support remains small. The "best" institution had all of its 
programs ranked at least one standard deviation and 80% 
ranked at least two standard deviations above the mean. The 
implied extent of substitution for this one institution was 
- 0.751 (col. 3a) and - 1.798 (col. 4a). The magnitude of the 
latter number (greater than one in absolute value) suggests 
that a nonlinear functional form is more appropriate here. In 
fact, for the specification in column 4a, any institution that 
had 43% or more of its programs rated at least two standard 
deviations above the mean, would have an implied extent of 
substitution of greater than one. Six institutions fell in this 
group. 
16All of the analyses presented in table 1 assume that the 
effects of changes in the various sources of external support 
(federal, foreign, and other United States (primarily corporate 
and foundation)) on the number of FTSEG supported by 
institutional funds are the same. Preliminary analyses that 
used data only for two years suggest that this assumption is 
warranted. See Ehrenberg, Rees, and Brewer (1992), table 5. 
17 A third line of approach is to postulate that since commit- 
ments to support graduate students are often made, at least 
implicitly, for more than one year at a time, that considerable 
inertia is built into the process and thus that substitution of 
external for internal funds occurs only with a lag. However, 
when a simple partial adjustment model was estimated, it 
implied that full adjustment did occur each year (Ehrenberg, 
Rees, and Brewer, 1992). 
18 We owe this hypothesis to Robert Hauser. 
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TABLE 3.-DETERMINANTS OF INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR FULL-TIME SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING STUDENTS IN RESEARCH 
AND DOCrORATE UNIVERSITIES, FALL 1979 TO FALL 1984: SELECTED COEFFICIENTS FROM ALTERNATIVE 
SPECIFICATIONS OF FIXED EFFEcrs MODELS 
(absolute value t-statistics) 
A) Intertemporal Response Modelsa 
Year Dummies Excluded Year Dummies Included 
(lx) (2x) (3x) (4x) (11) (21) (31) (41) 
ATOT - .213(5.6) - .204(5.3) - .198(5.2) - .178(4.6) - .181(5.1) - .173(4.8) - .169(4.8) - .181(4.5) 
ATOT(- 1) .081(2.3) .033(0.9) .039(1.0) .039(1.0) .092(2.8) .045(1.3) .049(1.4) .049(1.4) 
A TOT(- 2) .107(3.0) .036(0.9) .048(1.2) .105(3.1) .060(1.6) .065(1.8) 
A TOT( - 3) .165(4.6) .101(2.6) .107(3.2) .077(2.1) 
ATOT(- 4) .140(1.0) .068(2.0) 
aalso included in the models were TD2 and FTE2. 
B) Expected vs. Unexpected Change Modelsa 
Year Dummies Excluded Year Dummies Included 
(lx) (2x) (3x) (4x) (11) (21) (31) (41) 
A TOTE - .132(3.1) - .072(1.5) .019(0.4) .124(2.1) - .089(2.3) - .029(0.6) .036(0.7) .095(1.8) 
ATOTU - .213(5.5) - .215(5.8) - .217(5.9) - .206(5.7) - .181(5.0) - .182(5.2) - .180(5.2) - .168(5.0) 
Notes: 
ATOTE = ATOT(-1) in columns (1) 
= (ATOT(-1) +ATOT(-2))/2 in columns (2) 
= (ATOT(-1) +ATOT(-2) +ATOT(-3))/3 in columns (3) 
= (ATOT(-1) +ATOT(-2) +ATOT(-3) +ATOT(-4))/4 in columns (4) 
A TOTU = A TOT -A TOTE in each column 
and 
ATOT = number of FTSEG in the institution supported by external funds 
ATOTE = number supported by external funds that is expected 
ATOTU = number supported by external funds that is unexpected 
See table 2 for data sources. 
aAlso included in the models were the total bachelor's degrees in science and engineering granted by the institution (TD) and the total full-time scientific 
and engineering personnel employed in the institution (FTE). 
of the external support variables that one obtains 
when this is done are found in table 3a; models 
with variables representing one, two, three, and 
four years of lagged external support for graduate 
students were estimated.'9 Although the magni- 
tude of the response of current internal support 
to lagged values of external support differs across 
model specification, it is clear that focusing on 
the contemporaneous relationships overstate the 
extent of substitution of external for internal 
funds. Increases in external support for FTSEG 
in a period are associated with increases in 
internal support in subsequent periods that at 
least partially offset the contemporaneous substi- 
20 tution. 
Second, one can permit institutions to react 
differently to change in external support levels 
that they perceive as being transitory than to 
changes that they perceive as being permanent.2' 
Transitory increases, which are not expected to 
recur in future years, are unlikely to lead to large 
reallocations of institutional funds. Institutions 
may treat such increases as windfalls and com- 
pensatingly temporarily reduce their own expen- 
ditures for graduate support. In contrast, perma- 
nent increases, which institutions may view as 
fundamentally altering their wealth levels, are 
likely to lead to larger institutional commitments 
to graduate education and thus to less substitu- 
tion of external for institutional funds. To the 
extent that the variation in changes in external 
support levels across institutions during a two-year 
period reflect primarily transitory fluctuations, our 
estimates in table 2 may overstate the extent to 
which institutions would reduce their own inter- 
nal support for FTSEG in response to an in- 
crease in external support that was perceived to 
be more permanent. 
Siniple tests of this proposition are found in 
table 3b which presents estimates of coefficients 
19 Thus, the sample used now extends from 1975 to 1984. 
20 Indeed, formal F tests indicate that one can not reject at 
the 0.95 level the hypothesis that the sum of these effects is 
zero in 5 of the 8 specifications (columns (2x), (3x), (21), (31), 
and (41)). 21 We owe this point to Michael McPherson. 
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of ATOT from extended specifications of equa- 
tion (1) in which ATOT is divided into an ex- 
pected (ATOTE) and an unexpected (ATOTU) 
component. The expected component is naively 
defined as either a one, two, three, or four year 
average of lagged values of ATOT, while the 
unexpected component is defined as the differ- 
ence between the actual and expected compo- 
nents of ATOT in each specification.22 The co- 
efficients that result do indeed suggest that sub- 
stitution of external for internal support occurs 
primarily in response to unexpected changes in 
external support. 
IV. Disaggregation by Field 
To conclude that, in the aggregate, when the 
number of FTSEG supported by external funds 
increased by 100, institutions reduce the number 
of FTSEG they support out of institutional funds 
by about 18, is not to say that the response will be 
the same across all fields. To address the latter 
issue requires that separate analyses be under- 
taken by field. In doing so, however, one should 
allow for the possible interdependence of internal 
support levels across fields. For example, an in- 
crease in the number of students supported on 
external funds in one field might induce an insti- 
tution to reduce the number of students it sup- 
ports out of institutional funds in that field and 
then use all, or part, of the savings to fund more 
graduate students out of internal funds in other 
fields. 
One way to test whether such interdependen- 
cies exist is to estimate a system of equations of 
the form: 
I-kt ]a?k+ alkXjkt + a2kFjkt + a3kAjkt 
+ a4kAit + V1jk + Ejkt 
k= 1,2,...,7. (3) 
In the above equations, the subscript k indexes 
the field of study and the seven broad science and 
engineering subfields for which data were col- 
lected are engineering, physical sciences, life sci- 
ences, social sciences, environmental sciences, 
psychology, and mathematical sciences. The ap- 
pendix again provides a simple model that moti- 
vates this econometric specification. 
The number of students in a field supported 
out of institutional funds (Ijkt) is assumed to 
depend in this specification on both the number 
of students in the field supported by external 
funds (A1kt) and the number of students sup- 
ported by external funds in the institution as a 
whole (Ajt). Ceteris paribus, an increase of 100 in 
the number of students in field k supported by 
external funds would lead to a change in the 
number of students in field k supported by inter- 
nal funds of 100 (a3k + a4k). Similarly, an in- 
crease of 100 in the number of FTSEG students 
supported in the institution as a whole by exter- 
nal funds, with no increase in the number of 
students in field k supported by external funds, 
would lead to a change in the number of students 
supported by internal funds in field k of 100a4k. 
A positive estimate of a4k thus indicates that part 
of any increase in external support for graduate 
students elsewhere in a university is implicitly 
used to support graduate students in field k. 
Equations (3) were estimated in level form, 
including institution specific intercept terms to 
account for the fixed effects, and data from a 
sample of 117 institutions that reported data for 
all seven fields for two or more years during the 
Fall 1979 to Fall 1984 period. Estimates are re- 
ported in table 4 for specifications that included 
and excluded year dummy variables. 
Focusing first on the field-specific external sup- 
port variables (A TOTF), external support ap- 
pears to partially substitute for internal support 
in at least five of the seven fields and this substi- 
tution is statistically significant, in four of the 
fields. The magnitude of this substitution is largest 
in the physical sciences (44% to 59% depending 
upon the specification) and is also above 20% in 
the life sciences, environmental sciences, and psy- 
chology. Only for engineering (for one spec- 
ification) is there any evidence that increases in 
external support appear to be associated with 
increases in internal support.23 
22 It should be clear to the reader that the specifications 
estimated in columns (2), (3), and (4) of table 3b are restricted 
versions of the specifications estimated in the analogous 
columns of table 3a. In particular, in each case the restriction 
is that the coefficients of all of the lagged values of ATOT 
included in the specification are equal in magnitude. Formal 
F tests of these restrictions indicate that they can be rejected 
at the 0.05 level in only one of the six cases (column 3x). 
23 On average, about 25% of all externally supported FT- 
SEG in the sample are in engineering. Fields such as engi- 
neering that bring in a large amount of external support for 
graduate students, as well as other external research funds, 
may be able to use this success in debates over the allocation 
of internal funds to expand their share of internal graduate 
student support funds. 
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TABLE 4.-DETERMINANTS OF INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR FULL-TIME SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING GRADUATE STUDENTS 
IN RESEARCH AND DOCTORATE UNIVERSITIES, FALL 1979 TO FALL 1984: FIXED EFFECTS MODEL, BY FIELD 
Physical Life Social Environmental Mathematical 
Engineering Sciences Sciences Sciences Sciences Psychology Sciences 
A) No Year Intercepts 
ATOTF .102(2.6) - .440(8.9) - .228(6.0) - .069(1.4) - .232(5.9) - .293(7.0) .054(0.9) 
ATOT - .053(2.9) - .010(0.8) .021(1.1) - .008(0.3) - .003(0.7) .022(2.6) .019(1.9) 
TDF .210(4.2) .021(0.6) .010(0.8) .083(2.7) .001(0.0) - .024(0.7) .116(8.7) 
FTEF .090(1.8) .057(1.3) .017(1.9) .110(2.0) - .005(0.2) .013(0.3) .190(4.7) 
R2 .965 .943 .980 .954 .917 .925 .964 
B) Year Intercepts 
ATOTF .026(0.7) - .590(12.7) - .206(5.4) - .049(1.0) - .209(5.3) - .250(5.6) - .021(0.4) 
ATOT - .031(1.7) .008(0.7) .012(0.6) - .013(0.5) - .002(0.3) .020(2.3) .026(2.9) 
TDF .145(8.7) .040(1.2) .040(2.6) .075(2.4) - .028(0.9) - .015(0.5) .038(2.5) 
FTEF .024(0.5) .011(0.3) .008(0.9) .108(2.0) - .019(0.6) .014(0.3) .100(2.5) 
R2 .969 .955 .981 .955 .919 .926 .969 
Sources: See table 2. 
Notes: 
ATOTF = number of FTSEG in the field in the institution supported by external funds 
ATOT = number of FTSEG in the institution (all fields) supported by external funds 
TDF = total bachelor's degrees in the field granted by the institution 
FTEF = total full-time equivalent scientific and engineering personnel in the field employed by the institution. 
Of key interest are the estimated coefficients 
for the total external support variable (ATOT). 
These estimates suggest that increases in the 
overall number of students supported by external 
funds in the science and engineering fields are 
used partially to subsidize graduate students in 
psychology and the mathematical sciences. 
Ceteris paribus, an increase of 100 in the number 
of FTSEG supported by external funds outside of 
these fields, leads to an increase in the number of 
students supported on institutional funds of 
roughly 2 each in both psychology and the mathe- 
matical sciences. As noted in earlier sections, 
whether a similar subsidization of graduate edu- 
cation in the humanities occurs can not be ascer- 
tained from these NSF data because the data lack 
information on graduate student support in hu- 
manities fields. 
The estimates also suggest, however, that an 
increase in the overall number of students 
supported by external funds in the science and 
engineering fields, holding constant the number 
supported by external funds in engineering, is 
associated with a decrease in the number of stu- 
dents supported on internal funds in engineering. 
An increase in the number of nonengineering 
students supported on external funds of 100 is 
associated, ceteris paribus, with a decrease in the 
number of engineering students supported on 
internal funds of 3 to 5. This may reflect the 
politics of the allocation of internal funds within 
institutions, with fields that are relatively success- 
ful in generating external funds (engineering) los- 
ing some of their "internal clout" when other 
fields' success increases. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has demonstrated that doctorate- 
producing universities respond to changes in the 
number of FTSEG supported on external funds 
by altering the number of FTSEG that they sup- 
port on institutional funds. While institutional 
adjustment to changes in external support levels 
appear to be quite rapid, in the aggregate, the 
magnitude of these responses are quite small. An 
increase of 100 in the number of FTSEG sup- 
ported by external funds is estimated to reduce 
the number supported on institutional funds by 
about 18. Since some of the institutional funds 
that are "saved" may be redirected to support 
graduate students in the humanities and -other 
fields not represented in the data, the total affect 
of such a policy change on institutional support 
for graduate students is probably somewhat 
smaller. 
This finding must be qualified for at least three 
reasons. First, while there is evidence that such 
institutional adjustments occur in periods of both 
increasing and decreasing external support, they' 
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tend to occur primarily in high quality programs 
which typically are found in Research I institu- 
tions. Second, long-run responses appear to be 
smaller than short-run responses; some of the 
institutional funds that are contemporaneously 
saved when external support increases are ex- 
pended to support graduate students in subse- 
quent years. Third, there is evidence that these 
institutional responses are larger in response to 
transitory, or unexpected, changes in external 
support, than they are in response to permanent, 
or expected, changes in external support. On 
balance these results suggest that, in the aggre- 
gate, increases in external support for FTSEG 
would lead to much smaller decreases in institu- 
tional support for graduate students. 
Policymakers need be concerned, however, that 
the magnitudes of the responses appear to differ 
significantly across fields. There is also evidence 
that even within science and engineering there is 
some fungibility of external support across fields. 
In particular, institutional support for psychology 
and the mathematical sciences appears to in- 
crease somewhat in response to increases in ex- 
ternal support to other science and engineering 
fields which permit institutions to reduce their 
own support to these other fields, while increases 
in external support to nonengineering fields ap- 
pear to lead to decreases in institutional support 
for engineering. 
In evaluating the importance of our findings, 
the reader should consider several points. First, 
as noted in footnote 8, our analyses make use of 
data on number of students whose major sources 
of support come from institutional and external 
sources. We provide two reasons in the footnote 
why the use of such data might either overstate or 
understate the extent of substitution of external 
for institutional dollar funding of graduate stu- 
dents. Unfortunately, data on dollar amounts of 
institutional and external funding for graduate 
students are not available. Even if such data were 
available and one performed similar analyses to 
the ones we have performed using dollar funding 
levels, these analyses would still ignore the possi- 
bility that some of any "saved" institutional funds 
might be redirected by the institution to other 
uses that facilitate graduate students' degree 
progress. For example, institutions might use 
"saved" funds to provide graduate students with 
research support and/or with travel money for 
conferences. Hence, even if one had data on the 
dollar amounts of institutional and external fund- 
ing of graduate students, using the methodology 
we have employed might lead one to overstate 
the extent of substitution of external for internal 
funding of graduate education more generally. 
Second, FTSEG students who are supported 
from external funds typically receive different 
types of support than those who are supported 
from institutional funds. The former are more 
likely to receive fellowships and research assis- 
tantships, while the latter are more likely to re- 
ceive teaching assistantships.24 Analyses of data 
from a single major doctorate producing institu- 
tion on all graduate students who entered Ph.D. 
programs in four fields during a twenty-five year 
period suggests, other things held constant (in- 
cluding measured ability), that students who re- 
ceived fellowships and research assistantships had 
higher completion rates and shorter times-to- 
degree than students who received teaching assis- 
tantships.25 Hence, even if increased external 
funding substituted for institutional funding on a 
dollar-for-dollar basis, if this substitution altered 
the distribution of types of funding towards more 
fellowships and research assistantships, it should 
still serve to increase the flow of new doctorates 
by increasing doctoral students' completion rates 
and decreasing their mean times-to-degree. 
Finally, throughout the paper differences in 
institutional characteristics that might influence a 
university's desire and willingness to support 
graduate students are, for the most part, "buried" 
in the unobservable fixed effects. While in places 
we have included measures of graduate program 
quality in our analyses, and loosely linked our 
empirical research to simple utility maximizing 
models of university behavior, generalizations of 
our empirical models might productively be more 
explicitly tied to more general models of univer- 
sity utility maximization subject to budget con- 
24 For example, in the Fall of 1984 the proportions of 
FTSEG students whose major sources of support came from 
institutional and external funds, by type of support, in our 
sample were: 
Fellowship/ Research Teaching 
Traineeship Assistantship Assistantship Other 
Institutional .140 .176 .574 .110 
External .279 .515 .018 .188 
25 See Ehrenberg and Mavros (1992). 
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straints.26 One implication that would flow from 
such an approach is that institutional support for 
graduate students would depend on the "wealth" 
levels of institutions. This suggests that measures 
of state budgetary tightness (in the public sector) 
or endowment strength (in the private sector) 
would be candidates to be added to future empir- 
ical models. 
26 See, for example, Garvin (1980) and James (1990). 
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